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INTRODUCTION 
 
 There has long been debate over the propriety of having cameras in American 
courtrooms.1  The interests involved are myriad, ranging from the rights of defendants to a public 
trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the rights of the press as famously enshrined by 
the First Amendment—with many in between.  As technology progresses from one generation to 
the next, so does this debate.  Generally speaking, that progression has been from an initial 
prohibition of all camera use in court to a permissive stance that tolerates the use of cameras so 
long as certain interests, such as those in a fair trial, are protected.  One need think only of the 
O.J. Simpson and Michael Jackson trials to know that American legal proceedings are more 
documented now than ever before, and far more accessible to the public.2  Wider access has 
increased the public’s appetite for transparency in American courtrooms, as evidenced by 
recurring bipartisan proposals seeking to permit video documentation of federal legal 
proceedings.3  The latest such proposal, the Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2009, would 
authorize presiding judges to allow cameras in court except when to do so would violate the due 
process rights of any party.4   
As evidenced by the legislation’s repeated failure in Congress, however, there remain 
those who are very much against the notion of cameras in court.5  Not least among these 
detractors are five members of the United States Supreme Court, which in Hollingsworth v. 
                                                 
1 See generally MARJORIE COHN & DAVID DOW, CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM: TELEVISION AND THE PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICE (Roman & Littlefield 2002) (1998); RONALD L. GOLDFARB, TV OR NOT TV: TELEVISION, JUSTICE, AND THE 
COURTS (New York Univ. Press (1998); GERALD R. MILLER AND NORMAN E. FONTES, VIDEOTAPE ON TRIAL: A  VIEW 
FROM THE JURY BOX (Sage Publications 1979), William O. Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 ROCKY MT. L. 
REV. 1 (1960). 
2 Court TV has televised hundreds of civil cases in areas ranging from torts, product liability, civil rights, parental 
custody, copyright, and sexual harassment.  COURTROOM TELEVISION NETWORK, FACTS AND OPINIONS ABOUT 
CAMERAS IN COURTROOMS ii (1995). 
3 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-657&tab=related (last visited March 26, 2010). 
4 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-657&tab=summary (last visited March 26, 2010). 
5 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-657&tab=related (last visited March 26, 2010). 
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Perry recently took the unusual step of intervening in the internal operations of a federal district 
court to prohibit the broadcasting of proceedings concerning the constitutionality of Proposition 
8 in California.6  This action attracted media scrutiny due to the controversy surrounding 
Proposition 8, a referendum passed in 2008 that amended the California constitution to prohibit 
homosexual marriage.7  Advocates for greater transparency in American legal proceedings 
condemned the decision for denying the public its right to witness “a calm, deliberative debate 
on a vitally important issue.”8  One legal observer speculated that the ban on cameras might 
outlast that particular trial.9  This article similarly argues that the Court’s decision in Perry 
reflects a renewed and unjustified hostility toward the use of cameras in court that may limit the 
public’s access to federal legal proceedings for the foreseeable future. 
Part I recounts the history of the debate over cameras in the courtroom, beginning with 
their popular emergence and initial prohibition in the first half of the twentieth century.10  Part I 
proceeds with a discussion of state experimentation and the Supreme Court’s camera 
jurisprudence, concluding with an explication of its decision in Florida v. Chandler, in which it 
first upheld a program that permitted courtroom broadcasting.  Part II analyzes the Court’s 
decision in Perry, beginning with the underlying facts and procedural history and concluding 
with a discussion of the Court’s legal analysis.11  Part III examines the differences between the 
Court’s attitude toward cameras in Perry and Chandler, arguing that the Court’s renewed 
hostility is unjustified in light of technological developments, empirical research, programmatic 
improvements, and past precedent.12 
                                                 
6 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S.Ct. 705 (2010). 
7 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/opinion/14thu3.html (last visited March 26, 2010). 
8 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/opinion/14thu3.html (last visited March 26, 2010). 
9 http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/prop-8-court-tv-blocked/ (last visited March 26, 2010). 
10 See infra pp. 4-16. 
11 See infra pp. 16-23. 
12 See infra pp. 23-34. 
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE DEBATE OVER CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM 
 No one is certain when the camera first appeared in an American courtroom.13  We do 
know that still photography of court proceedings was relatively common as early as the 1920s, 
particularly in tabloids.14  At the outset, their use provoked controversy.15  Two trials in 
particular unleashed a torrent of criticism: the Scopes Monkey Trial and the Hauptmann trial.16  
These trials were both previews of the sensational coverage that we experience today whenever a 
celebrity faces justice and harbingers of the prohibition of cameras in court.17  The American Bar 
Association’s adoption of Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1937 consequently 
sought to remove cameras from court altogether.18  But individual states began to experiment on 
their own, prompting Supreme Court involvement to determine the constitutionality of particular 
state pilot programs.19  Eventually, federal courts were permitted to experiment as well.20  It was 
precisely that kind of federal experimentation that the Supreme Court prohibited in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry. 
A.  Early Abuses and Complete Prohibition 
 Featuring two of the greatest lawyers of its time, the Scopes Monkey Trial pitted 
Clarence Darrow against William Jennings Bryan in the first trial ever broadcast over radio.21  
The defendant, a high school teacher named Thomas Scopes, stood accused of teaching 
                                                 
13 See COHN, supra note 1, at 14. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 14-15. 
17 Id. at 14. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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evolution in violation of a law that allowed only the teaching of creationism.22  The presiding 
judge clearly relished the limelight, declaring at one point that his gavel would be heard around 
the world.23  But while the Scopes Monkey Trial was largely a novelty in its time, it was the 
Hauptmann trial that “shaped legal attitudes on [the role of cameras in the courtroom] for 
decades.”24  Bruno Richard Hauptmann was tried for kidnapping and murdering the son of famed 
aviator Charles Lindbergh.25  Although this trial was widely condemned for its circus 
atmosphere, it is doubtful that the presence of cameras did much to lessen the decorum attending 
the proceedings.26  No video imagery could be broadcast prior to the verdict, the court was 
usually packed well beyond capacity, and the “case was a magnet for the elite of the writing and 
broadcast world,” insuring that it would be well covered regardless of the imagery involved.27  
“There were also daily sightings of non-journalistic celebrities as the case assumed a chic role in 
New York society.”28  The scene outside the courtroom was downright chaotic, as a crowd 
chanted “Kill Hauptmann!” while the jury deliberated inside.29 
 Press coverage of the trial was “excessive” and “frequently inflammatory,” reflecting the 
journalistic standards of the time.30  Joseph Alsop of the New York Herald Tribune was required 
to write at least 10,000 words each day.31  The Hearst Corporation paid the defense attorney’s 
retainer and signed Anna Hauptmann to an exclusive contract.32  Still, Walter Lister of the 
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin could recall only one confirmed violation of the rule against 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 See COHN, supra note 1, at 14. 
24 Id. at 15. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 16. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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photographing while the court was in session.33  The American Bar Association nevertheless 
conducted an extensive investigation of camera and media involvement in the Hauptmann trial.34  
Joseph Costa, founder of the National Press Photographers Association, opined at the time that it 
was not the photography that was problematic, but the “very nature of the entire story” that 
generated the unruly environment.35  Nevertheless, on September 27, 1937, the House of 
Delegates unanimously adopted Professional Ethics and Grievances Committee revised Canon 
35, which called for a blanket ban on courtroom photography and radio broadcasting.36  In 1952, 
the House of Delegates amended Canon 35 to prohibit television cameras as well.37  Although 
lacking the force of law, Canon 35 proved very powerful, as by the 1950s only four states had 
moved toward permitting even limited camera coverage of legal proceedings.38  Today, this 
prohibition persists in Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prohibits 
photography and radio broadcasting in federal criminal trials.39   
B.  Relaxation of the Prohibition by Individual States 
 Colorado was the first state to formally allow television cameras into the courtroom, 
following an effort by local members of the media to obtain such access.40  After a steady stream 
of witnesses, many of whom were members of the media, testified in support of camera access,41 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 See COHN, supra note 1, at 17. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  Canon 35 read as follows:  
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum.  The taking of 
photographs in the courtroom during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the 
broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the 
proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the 
public and should not be permitted. 
Id. 
38 Id.  Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas, and Colorado were the four states that initially moved toward allowing cameras in court 
during the 1950s.  Id. 
39 FED. R. CRIM. P. 53. 
40 See COHN, supra note 1, at 18. 
41 Id. 
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the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that Canon 35 should not be strictly enforced in 
Colorado and issued a rule giving trial judges the discretion to grant camera access provided that 
no witness was required to have his picture taken or his testimony broadcast.42  Justice Moore, 
speaking for the court, dismissed concerns about sensationalizing trials by embracing the 
potential for broadcasting to educate the public about the judiciary, stating, “There is no field of 
governmental activity concerning which the people are as poorly informed as the field occupied 
by the judiciary.”43  He also articulated the view that “participants in legal proceedings are far 
more careful in their conduct and indulge in less bickering in those cases where cameras are 
permitted to operate under court supervision,” suggesting that the use of cameras would enhance 
both the accountability of the actors and the legitimacy of the proceedings.44   
Justice Moore began by disposing with any analysis under the federal constitution 
because the applicable provision of the Colorado constitution was “more inclusive in its 
coverage of the subject and equally binding upon us.”45  Cataloguing the constitutional interests 
at stake, he noted the inevitable tension between the freedom of speech and the right to a fair 
trial, but emphasized that there is no particular aspect of the judiciary that enables it, as 
distinguished from other democratic institutions, to censor its proceedings.46  He also recognized 
the inherent authority and obligation of courts to forbid any conduct that might interfere with the 
orderly conduct of court procedure.47  Before concluding that Canon 35 was too rigid an 
accommodation of these competing interests, the Court reasoned that “[i]n every case the power 
to regulate must not be arbitrarily imposed; it must be so exercised as not, in attaining a 
                                                 
42 In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465, 472 (Colo. 1956). 
43 Id. at 469 
44 Id. at 470. 
45 Id. at 467. 
46 Id. (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (“A trial is a public event.  What transpires in the courtroom is 
public property. . . .  There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other 
institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it.”). 
47 In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465, 467 (Colo. 1956). 
 8 
 
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.”48  Because Canon 35 improperly 
assumed that cameras would, in every case, interfere with the administration of justice, it unduly 
infringed on the freedom of the press.49  It is noteworthy for a decision rendered in 1956 that the 
court was moved by the unobtrusive nature of the technology then available, with Justice Moore 
boasting, “There was nothing connected with the telecast [of the hearing] which was obtrusive.  
The dignity or decorum of the court was not in the least disturbed.  Many persons entered and 
retired . . . without being aware that a live telecast was in progress.”50 
In Lyles v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals followed suit, expressly 
agreeing with the permissive rule adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court.51  The court 
explained that the question of whether to permit courtroom broadcasting required it to balance 
the constitutional rights of free speech and to public trial, on the one hand, against the right of an 
accused to fair trial and the power of courts to maintain the essential dignity of their proceedings, 
on the other.52  While acknowledging that courtroom disruptions should not be permitted, the 
court was also convinced that when done properly, courtroom broadcasting neither disturbs nor 
detracts from courtroom dignity or decorum.53  The court also dismissed the privacy interests of 
the accused, citing ample precedent that persons accused of crime lose their right of privacy, in 
favor of the contention that broadcasting is necessary to educate the public about the judiciary.54   
Decades later, following a year-long pilot program during which the media was permitted 
to broadcast state court proceedings, the Florida Supreme Court amended Canon 3A(7) of the 
Florida Code of Judicial Conduct to permit broadcasting of public judicial proceedings subject to 
                                                 
48 Id. at 468. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 330 P.2d 734, 745 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958). 
52 Id. at 738-39. 
53 Id. at 742. 
54 Id. at 741. 
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the authority of the presiding judge.55  Significantly, the amendment did not require that 
participants consent to the presence or use of broadcasting technology.56  The court reasoned that 
neither the pilot program nor a survey of those involved therein showed any adverse effect upon 
the administration of justice.57  Specifically, the court found that a study of the pilot program 
failed to establish that broadcasting causes excess disruption of court proceedings, exerts an 
adverse psychological effect on trial participants, exploits the courts for commercial or 
entertainment purposes, or results in unfair prejudicial publicity.58  Resting its holding upon a 
firm commitment to open government, the court asserted that there is more to be gained than lost 
by permitting courtroom broadcasting.59  In Florida v. Chandler, the United States Supreme 
Court would later uphold the constitutionality of this particular program, giving states the green 
light to permit courtroom broadcasting under appropriate circumstances.60 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Courtroom Broadcasting Jurisprudence 
 
 It is well settled that there is no constitutional right to broadcast, record, or photograph 
court proceedings.61  It is equally well settled that the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to a 
public trial is satisfied by the mere opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend 
the trial and to report what they have observed.62  Although Estes v. Texas,63 the Court’s first 
decision to squarely address the matter of courtroom broadcasting, initially stood for the 
proposition that broadcasting a trial denies due process to an accused, Chandler made clear that 
courtroom broadcasting does not inherently deny the due process rights of an accused.  Whereas 
                                                 
55 In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So.2d 764, 792 (Fla. 1979). 
56 Id.  Such consent could not practically be obtained.  Id. 
57 Id. at 780.   
58 Id. at 774-78. 
59 Id. at 780.  “The prime motivating consideration prompting our conclusion is this state's commitment to open 
government.”  Id. 
60 449 U.S. 560 (1981). 
61 Van Orden v. Indiana, 471 U.S. 1104 (1985). 
62 Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
63 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
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the Court broadly upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s carefully crafted broadcasting regime 
in Chandler, it had previously condemned the use of cameras in the trial of Billie Estes, holding 
that their use deprived him of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by compromising 
the decorum and dignity of the proceedings.64   
1. The Estes Court’s Analysis of the Constitutionality of Courtroom Broadcasting 
 
Authorities charged Billie Estes with swindling certain Texas farmers into purchasing 
equipment that did not exist.65  Intense pretrial publicity resulted in national notoriety for Estes 
and created such local buzz that the trial venue was changed to a location some 500 miles west.66  
The pretrial proceedings were broadcast live by both radio and television.67  At least a dozen 
cameramen were active in the courtroom, cables and wires “snaked across the courtroom floor,” 
and the parties conceded that the media presence “led to considerable disruption of the 
hearings.”68  The extensive publicity “could only have impressed those present, and also the 
community at large, with the notorious character of the petitioner as well as the proceeding.”69  
Put simply, Estes did not receive “that judicial serenity and calm to which [he] was entitled.”70  
By the time of trial, the media constructed a booth at the back of the courtroom that was painted 
to blend in and that featured an aperture through which a camera lens protruded.71  Throughout 
the trial, there were frequent objections over how the proceedings were covered, resulting in 
changes to the rules “as the exigencies of the situation seemed to require.”72  As a result, only the 
                                                 
64 Id. at 551. 
65 Id. at 534. 
66 Id. at 535. 
67 Id. at 536. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 537. 
72 Id. 
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opening and closing arguments of the State were broadcast live with sound.73  At the defendant’s 
request, the trial judge prohibited any broadcast of arguments by defense counsel.74   
The Court began its analysis by noting that the preeminent purpose of all court 
proceedings is “endeavoring to ascertain the truth which is the sine qua non of a fair trial.”75  It 
then recounted the reigning prohibition on broadcasting criminal trials, save in Colorado in 
Oklahoma under certain circumstances, as “weighty evidence that our concepts of a fair trial do 
not tolerate such an indulgence.”76  Declaring that the atmosphere of dignity and decorum “must 
be maintained at all costs,” the Court proceeded to examine arguments in favor of courtroom 
broadcasting.77  Rejecting the argument that the public has a right to be informed about the 
workings of the judiciary as proving too much, the Court reasoned that media of all stripes were 
equally free to attend and report on legal proceedings, satisfying the right to a public trial.78  In 
reply to the State’s argument that Estes was unable to show “isolatable prejudice” and that a 
showing of actual prejudice was required for reversal, the Court noted that some procedures 
employed by the State involved a sufficient “probability that prejudice will result that it is 
deemed inherently lacking in due process.”79  Analogizing the broadcasting of Estes’ trial to 
scenarios where the police serve as both witnesses against the accused and escorts for the jury,80 
the Court held the use of cameras under these circumstances to be “inherently suspect” and 
therefore violative of due process.81 
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 540. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 541-42 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)). 
79 Estes, 381 U.S. at 542-43. 
80 Id. at 544 (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965)). 
81 Estes, 381 U.S. at 544. 
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The Court then identified the constitutional dangers associated with courtroom 
broadcasting.82  It listed the effect of broadcasting on jurors as “perhaps of the greatest 
significance,” asserting that “[f]rom the moment the trial judge announces that a case will be 
televised it becomes a cause celebre.”83  The court was concerned about the conscious or 
unconscious effect on juror judgment since “realistically it is only the notorious trial which will 
be broadcast.”84  Jurors will be unable to “help but feel the pressures of knowing that friends and 
neighbors have their eyes upon them.”85  It next identified the reduced quality of witness 
testimony as a potential danger, noting that some witnesses may be “demoralized and frightened, 
some cocky and given to overstatement.”86  The distractions levied upon the trial judge were also 
of concern, given the need for the judge presiding over the Estes trial to frequently consider and 
rule upon objections concerning courtroom broadcasting.87   
Lastly, the Court expressed concern over the impact of broadcasting on the defendant in a 
criminal trial, asserting that “[t]he inevitable close-ups of his gestures and expressions during the 
ordeal of his trial might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to 
concentrate on the proceedings before him.”88  In addition to the prejudice that would “inevitably 
result” from the heightened public clamor, defendants may be deprived of effective assistance of 
counsel as his attorney might resort to professional showmanship.89  The Court refused to afford 
weight to these considerations simply because they were psychological hypotheticals, instead 
acknowledging that “ever-advancing techniques of public communication and the adjustment of 
the public to its presence may bring about a change in the effect of telecasting upon the fairness 
                                                 
82 Id. at 544-50. 
83 Id. at 545. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 547. 
87 Id. at 548. 
88 Id. at 549. 
89 Id. 
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of criminal trials.”90  Importantly, Justice Harlan, who furnished the fifth vote in Estes, 
subscribed to the Court’s opinion on the premise that it was limited to “cases like this one” and 
predicted that “the day may come when television will have become so commonplace an affair in 
the daily life of the average person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood that its use in 
courtrooms may disparage the judicial process.”91 
2. The Chandler Court’s Analysis of the Constitutionality of Courtroom Broadcasting 
 
Twenty-five years later, the Court revisited its constitutional analysis of courtroom 
broadcasting in Florida v. Chandler, upholding the constitutionality of Florida’s pilot program, 
which permitted the broadcasting of all judicial proceedings even absent the consent of the 
parties.92  As discussed previously, the Florida Supreme Court amended its rules to permit 
courtroom broadcasting following a yearlong experimental period running from July 1977 to 
June 1978.93  The amended rule provided specific implementing guidelines that restricted media 
to one camera, required pooling amongst the media, banned artificial lighting, required that 
equipment not be moved, and prohibited coverage of conversations between parties and counsel 
and of the jury altogether.94  The judge was given power to “forbid coverage whenever satisfied 
that [it] may have a deleterious effect on the paramount right of the defendant to a fair trial.”95 
The defendants were Miami Beach policemen charged with conspiracy to commit 
burglary.96  They were caught by an amateur radio operator “who, by sheer chance, had 
overheard and recorded conversations . . . over their police walkie-talkie radios during the 
                                                 
90 Id. at 551-52. 
91 Id. at 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).   
92 Chandler, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). 
93 Id. at 565. 
94 Id. at 566. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 567. 
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burglary.”97  The media response to these “novel factors” was predictable, as the case attracted 
much attention from local media outlets.98  The defendants unsuccessfully sought to have the 
amended Florida rule declared unconstitutional both on its face and as applied.99  Each juror was 
instead asked whether the media coverage would affect his or her judgment and each responded 
in the negative.100  The court further instructed the jury to avoid the local news.101 
The Court began its analysis by rejecting the argument that Estes announced a per se 
constitutional rule that courtroom broadcasting is inherently a denial of due process, emphasizing 
the confining nature of Justice Harlan’s concurrence.102  The Court then gave its reasons for not 
announcing such a per se rule, as the defendants requested.  Echoing the Colorado Supreme 
Court’s concern that an absolute ban would needlessly infringe on protected liberties, the Court 
declared, “An absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be justified 
simply because there is a danger that, in some cases, prejudicial broadcast accounts of pretrial 
and trial events may impair the ability of jurors to decide the issue of guilt or innocence 
uninfluenced by extraneous matters.”103  Seeming to reject language in Estes, the Court argued 
that cases attract publicity not because of a decision to allow courtroom broadcasting, but instead 
“because of [their] intrinsic interest to the public and the manner of reporting the event.”104   
The Court then took notice of numerous amici briefs “in support of continuing 
experimentation such as that embarked upon by Florida,” as well as of “the change in television 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 573.  “Justice Harlan’s opinion . . . must be read as defining the scope of that holding; we conclude that Estes is 
not to be read as announcing a constitutional rule barring still photographic, radio, and television coverage in all cases 
and under all circumstances.”  Id. 
103 Id. at 574-75. 
104 Id. at 575. 
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technology since 1962, when Estes was tried.”105  No longer was the technology itself disruptive, 
for the “cumbersome equipment, cables, distracting lighting, [and] numerous camera 
technicians” were strictly creatures of the past.106  Additionally, empirical evidence had come to 
support the proposition that a per se ban on all courtroom broadcasting was needlessly harsh to 
other constitutional interests.107  After conceding that the research remained limited, the Court 
observed, “Still, it is noteworthy that the data now available do not support the proposition that, 
in every case and in all circumstances, electronic coverage creates a significant adverse effect 
upon the participants in trials—at least not one uniquely associated with electronic coverage as 
opposed to more traditional forms . . . .”108   
The Court also thought significant the many safeguards built in “to avoid some of the 
most egregious problems envisioned . . . in the Estes case,” noting that the amended rule 
admonished Florida judges to protect certain vulnerable classes of witnesses and to enforce the 
right of the accused to a fair trial.109  The amended rule further required that objections by the 
accused be heard and decided on the record by the trial court, giving the accused an opportunity 
to appeal and show that courtroom broadcasting unfairly prejudiced his particular trial.110  Thus, 
because the defendants failed to show that broadcasting was inherently prejudicial or that it 
actually prejudiced their trial,111 there were no grounds to adopt a per se constitutional ban that 
would offend basic notions of federalism by ending further state experimentation in the field.112  
Emphasizing the limits of its authority in the debate over courtroom broadcasting, the Court 
                                                 
105 Id. at 576. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 576 n.11. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 576-77. 
110 Id. at 577. 
111 Id. at 578-79. 
112 Id. at 579-80. 
 16 
 
remarked, “Absent a showing of prejudice of constitutional dimensions to these defendants, there 
is no reason for this Court either to endorse or to invalidate Florida’s experiment.”113 
II. THE COURT’S DECISION IN PERRY 
 In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Supreme Court addressed the matter of courtroom 
broadcasting for the third time, albeit indirectly.  In staying the broadcast of the proceedings 
below, the Court insisted that it was not “expressing any view on whether such trials should be 
broadcast,”114 but instead confining itself strictly to the question of “whether the District Court’s 
amendment of its local rules to broadcast this trial complied with federal law.”115  The Court’s 
analysis of whether irreparable harm would result from the denial of a stay nonetheless featured 
a discussion of courtroom broadcasting that reflects a shift away from its tolerant approach in 
Florida v. Chandler.116  The Court conceded that “[t]he arguments in favor of developing 
procedures and rules to allow broadcast of certain cases have considerable merit.”117  Still, 
because the case “involv[ed] issues subject to intense debate in our society” and the district court 
intended to broadcast witness testimony, the Court concluded that “[t]his case is therefore not a 
good one for a pilot program,” suggesting that any high-profile case of great public import will 
be inappropriate for broadcasting.118 
A.  The Factual and Procedural History of Perry 
 In November 2008, California voters passed Proposition 8, which amended the State 
Constitution to say that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.”119  Gay rights advocates promptly filed suit alleging that the amendment violates the 
                                                 
113 Id. at 582. 
114 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S.Ct. 705, 706 (2010) 
115 Id. at 709. 
116 Id. at 712-14. 
117 Id. at 713. 
118 Id. at 714. 
119 CAL. CONST. ART. I, §7.5. 
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Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.  The State of 
California declined to defend Proposition 8’s constitutionality, at which point the amendment’s 
proponents intervened to defend its constitutionality.120  On September 25, 2009, Chief Judge 
Walker of the Northern District Court of California informed the parties at a hearing of the 
public interest in broadcasting the proceedings, noting that related Judicial Conference positions 
may well change to accommodate that interest.121  Meanwhile, with this case in mind, a 
committee of judges recommended to the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council that district courts be 
allowed to experiment with courtroom broadcasting.122  On December 17, 2009, the Judicial 
Council announced its approval of such a pilot program, amending a 1996 policy that had banned 
all photography of Ninth Circuit court proceedings.123 
 On December 21, a group of media companies officially requested permission from the 
district court to televise the trial challenging Proposition 8.124  Two days later, on its website, the 
court amended a local rule banning courtroom broadcasting to allow for participation in the pilot 
program or other projects authorized by the Judicial Council.125  On December 31, that 
amendment was removed and a new announcement was posted stating that a proposed revision 
to the local rule had been approved for public comment.126  The proposed revision was the same 
as the previously announced amendment.127  Comments were welcome until January 8, 2010.128  
But on January 4, the court again revised the posting, declaring that the revised local rule was 
effective as of December 22, 2009, pursuant to an “immediate need” provision that obviated the 
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need for prior notice and comment.129  After a hearing held on January 6 regarding the recording 
and broadcasting of the upcoming trial, the court announced that the trial proceedings, set to 
begin January 11, would be streamed live to certain other federal courthouses.130  On January 7, 
the court formally requested inclusion of the trial in the pilot program “subject to the terms and 
conditions discussed at the . . . hearing.”131  The applicants simultaneously filed a petition for a 
writ of mandamus seeking to stay the district court’s order.132  The next day, a three-judge panel 
of the Ninth Circuit denied the petition and issued an order approving the decision to broadcast 
the trial simultaneously to five federal courthouses.133  On January 9, 2010, the applicants filed 
an application for a stay of the district court’s order with the United States Supreme Court.134 
B.  The Perry Court’s Majority Opinion135 
 In a per curiam opinion, the Court opened its analysis by again insisting, “We do not here 
express any views on the propriety of broadcasting court proceedings generally.”136  The Court 
then proceeded by setting forth the law on obtaining stays pending the filing and disposition of 
petitions for writs of certiorari and mandamus, noting first that the applicants had “shown a fair 
prospect that a majority of this Court” would later grant such petitions.137  The only remaining 
consideration under the Court’s rubric for deciding whether a stay should issue was “the 
likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay.”138  But before tackling that 
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question directly, the Court addressed the applicants’ allegation that the district court violated 
federal law in promulgating its revised local rule.139 
 Although district courts have discretion to adopt local rules, the Court reasoned, federal 
law requires that they follow certain procedures to adopt or amend a local rule.140  Specifically, 
“[l]ocal rules typically may not be amended unless the district court ‘giv[es] appropriate public 
notice and an opportunity for comment.’”141  A limited exception allows courts to dispense with 
prior notice and comment where “there is an immediate need for a rule.”142  The Court then 
concluded that the amended local rule was invalid due to the district court’s failure to provide for 
an appropriate notice and comment period, complaining that only “five business days” were 
given for notice and comment.143  The court then juxtaposed the functions of a district court with 
those of an administrative agency engaged in rulemaking, noting that agencies “usually” allow 
thirty days for comment.144  The Court dismissed the argument that the parties were alerted and 
permitted to brief on the subject as early as September 25, 2009, three months before the rule 
change, noting that the first public announcement did not arise until December 23, 2009.145  
Without any citation to legal precedent or reference to legislative intent, the Court declared that 
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the period allowed by the district court fell “far short” of the appropriate notice and comment 
required under the statute governing rulemaking by the courts.146   
Emphasizing the importance of this reasoning to its holding, the Court remarked that 
“[t]he need for a meaningful comment period was particularly acute in this case” because “courts 
and legislatures have proceeded with appropriate caution in addressing this question.”147  The 
Court then cited a multiyear study of the issue by the Federal Judicial Center which concluded 
simply that “the intimidating effect of cameras on some witness and jurors [is] cause for 
concern.”148  The fact that the Judicial Conference had continued to adhere to its position on 
courtroom broadcasting also, the Court argued, reinforced the importance of adopting “a 
proposed rule only after notice and an adequate period for public comment.”149   
As for the argument that notice and comment was unnecessary under the “immediate 
need” exception, the Court declared that the district court’s desire to conform its rules with those 
of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference in order to broadcast the trial did not qualify as an 
immediate need, again without citation to legal precedent or legislative intent.150  The Court 
again likened this situation to that of an administrative agency and concluded that the exception 
“likely” would not have been available to an agency.151  The Court also asserted that the original 
local rule prohibiting all photography was not inconsistent with the pilot program adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, remarking that “nothing in that program . . . required any 
‘immediate’ revision in local rules.”152  Thus, the district court should simply have allowed more 
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time for comment if it wished to change the rule, notwithstanding any resulting inability to 
broadcast a trial of great public interest.153 
 Having concluded the revised local rule was invalid, the Court proceeded to weigh the 
balance of equities pertaining to the applicants’ request for a stay.154  Here the Court detoured 
from its analysis of the “narrow legal issue”155 of whether the procedure employed by the district 
court violated federal law to discuss the relative merit of broadcasting in this particular case.  
The Court began with the conclusion that “[i]t would be difficult—if not impossible—to reverse 
the harm from those broadcasts.”156  In support of this assertion, the Court noted that the trial 
would feature numerous witnesses, specifically mentioning same-sex couples, academics, and 
those who participated in the campaign to adopt Proposition 8.157  Then, citing Estes, the Court 
noted its prior recognition that “witness testimony may be chilled if broadcast.”158  The Court 
elaborated, “Some of applicants’ witnesses have already said that they will not testify if the trial 
is broadcast, and they have substantiated their concerns by citing incidents of past 
harassment.”159   
Without demonstrating how courtroom broadcasting would exacerbate these matters 
given the high profile these witnesses already had,160 the Court opined that “[t]here are 
qualitative differences between making public appearances regarding an issue and having one’s 
testimony broadcast throughout the country.”161  This claim is difficult to reconcile with the facts 
of this case, for these supporters were already the subject of so much publicity that any 
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additional attention would be marginal at most.162  Nonetheless, the Court continued, claiming 
that “[i]t is difficult to demonstrate or analyze whether a witness would have testified differently 
if his or her testimony had not been broadcast.”163  The Court made no reference to any empirical 
research or literature to support its conclusion.  Next, the Court noted that “witnesses subject to 
harassment as a result of broadcast of their testimony might be less likely to cooperate in any 
future proceeding,” again without any empirical or other support.164   
The Court then briefly disposed of the public interest in courtroom broadcasting, noting 
that “respondents have not alleged any harm if the trial is not broadcast.”165  It also claimed a 
“significant interest in supervising the administration of the judicial system” and a duty to 
invalidate local rules that violate federal law that is “particularly acute when those rules relate to 
the integrity of judicial processes.”166  In concluding, the Court stressed that “the order in 
question complied neither with existing rules or policies nor the required procedures for 
amending them.”167  The lack of a regular rule thus threatened the dignity and decorum “that 
courts rely upon to ensure the integrity of their own judgments.”168  The Court then elaborated 
further, noting that even had the local rule been revised properly, questions would remain about 
the propriety of broadcasting “this particular trial, in which several of the witnesses have stated 
concerns for their own security.”169  Citing favorably to instances of courtroom broadcasting that 
were not “high profile” or did not involve witnesses, the Court concluded that this case was not 
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appropriate for broadcasting in any event.170  “Even the studies that have been conducted thus far 
have not analyzed the effect of broadcasting in high-profile, divisive cases,” the Court added, 
raising the bar on future courtroom broadcasting.171 
III. THE PERRY COURT’S UNJUSTIFIED HOSTILITY TOWARD COURTROOM BROADCASTING 
 
 Although the Court insisted that it was not addressing the merits of courtroom 
broadcasting, one cannot help but feel that its opinion reflects a renewed hostility toward the 
prospect of cameras in the courtroom, even under circumstances that minimize the dangers 
initially recognized in Estes.  The Court insisted that the potential effect on witness testimony 
and safety was its overriding concern when the facts cited by the Court ably demonstrated that 
courtroom broadcasting would at most incrementally increase the level of publicity involved.  
Ignoring the weight of empirical evidence and legal precedent in support of broadcasting 
courtroom proceedings, the Court instead rested its holding on the dubious proposition that the 
revised local rule was promulgated with inadequate notice and comment and therefore invalid.  
This action is beyond compare in the Court’s precedent, for it has never before micromanaged 
the internal affairs of a district court in such a manner.172  The Court also overlooked historical 
and technological developments that work to mitigate the dangers of courtroom broadcasting, in 
spite of prior promises to the contrary in both Estes and Chandler. 
A. The Perry Court’s Renewed Hostility toward Cameras in Court: A Return to Estes 
 
 In a vigorous dissent joined by justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, Justice Breyer 
took issue with nearly every assertion made by the Court in its analysis of both the narrow legal 
issue of whether the district court amended its local rule properly and the broader question of 
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whether courtroom broadcasting would work irreparable harm on the applicants.173  On the 
question of courtroom broadcasting, Justice Breyer aptly acknowledged that “the wisdom of a 
camera policy is primarily a matter for the proper administrative bodies to determine.  This Court 
has no legal authority to address that larger policy question except insofar as it implicates a 
question of law.”174  Noting that the only legal principle that invokes that policy question here is 
the nature of the harm at issue and the resulting balance of equities, including the public interest, 
Justice Breyer first addressed the harms alleged by the Court.175  Finding no basis for the Court’s 
conclusion, he asserted, “Certainly there is no evidence that such harm could arise in this nonjury 
civil case from the simple fact of transmission itself.”176  Then, citing to Chandler, he pointed 
out that the applicants were unable to produce any empirical data to suggest that courtroom 
broadcasting inherently has an adverse effect on legal proceedings.177  Finally, any harm to the 
parties would be reparable through appeal.178 
 Given these considerations, Justice Breyer could not see how any fair balancing of the 
equities weighed in favor of the applicants, for the applicants’ equities consisted solely of 
potential harm to witnesses that was “either nonexistent or that [could] be cured through 
protective measures . . . .”179  On the other side of the ledger, the competing equities included 
both the plaintiff’s interest in broadcasting the proceedings but also “the public’s interest in 
observing trial proceedings to learn about this case and about how courts work.”180  Observing 
that the Court’s institutional competence, historical practice, and governing precedent all 
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counseled “strongly against the issue of this stay,” Justice Breyer concluded that the “scales tip 
heavily against, not in favor, of issuing the stay.”181   
Indeed, the Court made no reference to any of the countervailing equities listed by Justice 
Breyer, allowing no room for the public interest in courtroom broadcasting in its analysis.  
Although the Court’s due process analysis of courtroom broadcasting in Estes and Chandler 
properly omitted reference to the public interest therein, the balancing of equities in Perry called 
for the inclusion of that consideration.  In Perry, the proceeding involved no criminal defendant 
with due process rights uniquely sensitive to prejudice by way of courtroom broadcasting.  
Rather, the proceeding concerned one of the most controversial and debated subjects of our time: 
whether homosexual couples should have the right to marry.  One can think of few cases that are 
of such interest to the public, yet the Court counted the public interest not at all in its balancing 
of the equities.  On the contrary, the Court strongly implied that any controversial case of great 
public interest would be inappropriate for courtroom broadcasting, effectively inverting that 
consideration.182  This deviated noticeably from the approach taken by the Chandler Court, 
which recognized that cases attract publicity “because of [their] intrinsic interest to the public,” 
not because of courtroom broadcasting itself.183  Thus, while the Chandler Court appreciated that 
any increased publicity would be marginal in high-profile cases, the Perry Court concluded 
simply that any increased publicity in such cases was unacceptable.  Although it is true that the 
Chandler Court also placed great weight on the numerous safeguards established by the Florida 
Supreme Court,184 the Perry Court made no mention of that either, perhaps because Ninth Circuit 
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judges had experience directing the broadcast of civil nonjury trials185 and the “terms and 
conditions” had been discussed with the parties at the hearing of January 6, 2010, presumably 
resolving such concerns.186 
 Just as the Perry Court deviated from the forward-looking approach of Chandler, it 
returned to the blanket hostility characteristic of Estes.  To be sure, the Perry Court’s failure to 
recognize the public’s interest in observing the proceedings was akin to the Estes Court’s 
rejection of that consideration outright,187 though in Perry the federal pilot program was 
explicitly created to satisfy the public’s interest in the proceedings,188 as was the case in 
Chandler.189  But while the Court’s concerns about courtroom broadcasting in Estes were 
perhaps justified in the name of caution, its unsupported assertion in Perry that broadcasting 
would work irreparable harm to the applicants’ witnesses is outdated in light of the sheer weight 
of precedent, logic, and empirical literature suggesting that the effect on witnesses is nominal.  
Gone are the days of unwieldy technology that inevitably disrupts the proceedings.190  No longer 
is society unfamiliar with or intimidated by broadcasting technology.191  Yet the majority 
opinion, which cited to Estes but not Chandler, seemed to adopt the Estes position that it was the 
fact of courtroom broadcasting that made a case a “cause celebre,”192 rather than the intrinsic 
nature of the case itself, when it suggested that any broadcast of a high-profile case was 
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unacceptable.193  While that may have been true in the days of the Scopes Monkey and 
Hauptmann trials, when a radio broadcast of legal proceedings counted as popular entertainment, 
the same cannot be said today.  Many of the Estes Court’s statements regarding the impact of 
courtroom broadcasting on witnesses, jurors, and other participants have since been debunked by 
empirical research.194  Furthermore, the concern of “greatest significance” to the Estes Court—
the effect of broadcasting on jurors195—was of course no concern at all in Perry.  Nevertheless, 
the Perry Court adopted the presumption in Estes that prejudice would “inevitably result” from 
the heightened public clamor,196 despite its incongruity with the facts of the case, which suggest 
that the witnesses would suffer little or no additional publicity as a result.197  This renewed 
hostility toward courtroom broadcasting is thus unjustified. 
B. The Court’s Exaggeration of the Effect on Witness Testimony and Other Potential Harms 
Involved 
 
 The Court’s argument that courtroom broadcasting will work irreparable harm to the 
witnesses themselves, “presumably by increasing the public’s awareness of who those witnesses 
are,” fails upon closer scrutiny.198  It is claimed that testifying before a limited broadcast to five 
other courthouses, as opposed to simply testifying publicly in a room full of hundreds, is 
qualitatively different.199  The Court speculated further that courtroom broadcasting may lead to 
violence against witnesses, thus discouraging any future participation.200  But, as Justice Breyer 
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pointed out, the witnesses did not ask the Court to set aside the order, even though they were 
entitled to do so.201  “And that is not surprising,” he reasoned: 
All of the witnesses supporting the applicants are already publicly identified with 
their cause.  They are all experts or advocates who have either already appeared 
on television or Internet broadcasts, already toured the State advocating a “yes” 
vote on Proposition 8, or already engaged in extensive public commentary far 
more likely to make them well known than a close circuit broadcast to another 
federal courthouse.202 
 
Moreover, the possibility of irreparable harm is further reduced by the mere fact that the order in 
question only increases the viewing audience from the size of one courtroom to the size of 
several.203  Rather than broadcasting these events around the country, the court was 
accommodating an overflow crowd given the tremendous public interest in this case.  Simple 
logic suggests that the marginal increase in publicity caused by courtroom broadcasting would 
do little to sway a timid witness who is already appearing in public and before possibly hundreds 
of onlookers, let alone the professional expert witness hired by the applicants.  Anyone familiar 
with public speaking knows that it matters little to the nerves whether one speaks before a 
hundred or a thousand.  Adrenaline does not distinguish. 
 To further demonstrate the incremental effect that courtroom broadcasting would have in 
this case, it is worth noting that there were literally hundreds of national and international 
newspapers and “reporting in detail the names and testimony of all of the witnesses.”204  Justice 
Breyer could therefore see “no reason why the incremental increase in exposure caused by 
transmitting these proceedings . . . would create any further risk of harm, as the Court apparently 
believes.”205  Finally, Justice Breyer noted another consideration, prominent in Chandler, which 
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weighed in favor of courtroom broadcasting.  If it were shown that transmission would harm a 
particular witness, the district court would be perfectly able to prevent it by ending the 
transmission for that portion of the proceeding.206  Firm control by a trial judge “will be 
sufficient to address any possible harm, either to the witnesses or the integrity of the trial.”207  
This was all too clear to the Chandler Court, which also took notice of the conclusion reached by 
other courts that television coverage “did not have an adverse impact on the trial participants 
sufficient to constitute a denial of due process.”208  In embracing the applicants’ fear of harm to 
the witnesses, the Perry Court thus ignored both the dictates of logic and much legal precedent to 
the contrary. 
C. The Court’s Superfluous Concern over Inadequate Notice and Comment 
  Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the Court’s opinion is the extent to which its 
holding rests on the inadequacy of the notice and comment period provided by the district court.  
As Justice Breyer concluded, 
 [I]t is inappropriate as well as unnecessary for this Court to intervene in the 
procedural aspects of local judicial administration.  Perhaps that is why I have not 
been able to find any other case in which this Court has previously done so, 
through emergency relief [as here] or otherwise.  Nor am I aware of any instance 
in which this Court has preemptively sought to micromanage district court 
proceedings as it does today.209 
 
He reached that conclusion for several reasons.  First, the parties themselves “had more than 
adequate notice and opportunity to comment” and both sides in fact submitted written arguments 
to the trial court.210  Second, the members of the judiciary who were involved did not lack 
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information about the issue.211  In fact, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council adopted a permissive 
policy with regard to appellate proceedings in May 1996.212  Moreover, in 2007, both lawyers 
and judges resoundingly approved a resolution favoring the use of cameras in district court civil 
nonjury proceedings at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference.213  The Judicial Council then 
adopted the pilot program, compelling the district court to revise its rules to conform 
therewith.214  Thus, Justice Breyer argued, the district court properly availed itself of the 
immediate need exception.215  The applicants could point to no interested person unaware of the 
change or who lacked an opportunity to comment, leading Justice Breyer to inquire, “How can 
the Majority reasonably demand yet more notice in respect to a local rule modification that a 
statute likely requires regardless?”216 
 The Court’s analogy to administrative agencies is also without precedent and, seemingly, 
logical support.  Whereas the notice and comment procedures under the Administrative 
Procedure Act insure some measure of democratic participation in the rulemaking process, it 
does not follow that they serve the same function for the judiciary, the least political and most 
independent of the three branches.  Moreover, even assuming the purpose of notice and comment 
in the judicial setting is to facilitate public participation in the local rulemaking process, here 
“the entire public was invited by the District Court to submit comments after the rule change was 
announced, right up to the eve of trial.”217  There were 138,574 comments submitted, “all but 32 
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of which favored transmitting the proceedings.”218  This suggests that the Court’s interest in an 
adequate notice and comment period was pretextual, for its interest could not truly have been in 
aiding the prospects of participatory democracy. 
 Taking notice of this oddity, Justice Breyer observed that “this legal question is not the 
kind of legal question that this Court would normally grant certiorari to consider.  There is no 
conflict among the state or federal courts . . . .  Nor do the procedures below clearly conflict with 
any precedent of this court.”219  For over 80 years, local judicial administration had been left to 
the “exclusive province” of the Circuit Judicial Councils, “and this Court lacks their institutional 
experience.”220  In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, Justice Scalia himself went even 
further, arguing forcefully that although courts have “inherent supervisory authority over the 
proceedings conducted before [them],” the Supreme Court has only the authority to review a 
lower court’s exercise of that authority insofar as it relates to a judgment brought before the 
Court.221  Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, “I do not see the basis for any direct authority to 
supervise lower courts.”222  Similarly, in Frazier v. Heebe, Justice Scalia joined a dissent 
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist that disputed any authority to “review and revise local Rules 
of a District Court . . . .”223  Not only are such interventions unprecedented, but members of the 
majority doubt the Court’s authority to review rulemakings by lower courts.  This further 
suggests that the Court’s reasoning is but a means to an end, with the desired outcome 
determining the analysis.   
D. Overlooked Historical and Technological Developments That Favor Courtroom Broadcasting 
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 As noted by Justice Breyer, what empirical research that has been done suggests that the 
impact of courtroom broadcasting on witness testimony is minimal at most.224  One of the most 
highly regarded studies done to date evaluated the California experiment with courtroom 
broadcasting by surveying participants from 200 legal proceedings ranging from criminal 
arraignments to trials.225  “Three-quarters of those surveyed said they were either unaware, or 
only a little aware of the televised coverage, and four-fifths insisted they were either not at all 
distracted or were distracted only at first by the presence of the cameras.”226  Most distractions 
came not from television cameras, but from still photography.227  Ninety percent of the lawyers 
and judges involved reported little or no interference with courtroom dignity and decorum.228  
Significantly, only two percent reported that the camera’s presence affected their behavior, half 
the number that reported being affected by the presence of the general media.229  Jurors, 
meanwhile, actually reported “slightly greater attentiveness” when the cameras were present.230   
Similar results were found by the Federal Judicial Center in its evaluation of a pilot 
program involving electronic coverage in six district courts and two courts of appeals.231  
Another study done at the University of Wisconsin reached similar results even when it corrected 
for the self-reporting bias that is associated with surveys generally.232  It found no difference in 
the ability of students to remember events in a film seen earlier when testifying before a 
camera.233  Notably, those students “who faced an obvious camera provided answers that were 
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more correct, lengthier, and more detailed.”234  A study done at the University of Minnesota also 
found the impact of courtroom broadcasting on participants to be limited, conceding that while 
those who testified before a camera were slightly more nervous, their performance was 
unaffected otherwise, 235 in line with the logical considerations discussed in Part III.B supra.  
“Those who testified before a camera recalled just as much correct information and committed 
no more errors than witnesses who testified with only a print journalist present or no coverage at 
all.”236  As Justice Breyer observed, a survey of these and other studies showed that while no 
study found any tangible harm to witness testimony, some found that courtroom broadcasting 
actually increased the accuracy of the proceedings and the accountability of those involved.237   
This echoes the sentiment of Justice Moore of the Colorado Supreme Court, who was 
among the first to suggest that the use of cameras would enhance both the accountability of the 
actors and the legitimacy of the proceedings.238  His words would later prove prophetic, for 
subsequent research overwhelmingly suggests that courtroom broadcasting does little to 
adversely affect legal proceedings, but may enable observers to see through the hysteria.  One 
study concludes that television cameras do not inhibit two thirds of witnesses.239  Another study 
conducted by Court TV in the wake of the O.J. Simpson trial, which raised anew many of the 
Estes concerns over courtroom broadcasting, found that trial participants “are not affected in any 
special way by the presence of a silent camera in the courtroom and certainly less affected than 
they were in the last century when major community trials were much-heralded spectator events 
and the talk of the town.”240  That same text aptly observes that sensational trials existed long 
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before television cameras did, noting that over a dozen trials in the previous 75 years had been 
dubbed “the trial of century,” none of which were recorded on television until the trial of O.J. 
Simpson.241  As for the O.J. Simpson trial as an example of the hysteria that supposedly ensues 
from courtroom broadcasting, the study found that, “[i]n fact, the camera inside the courtroom 
act[ed] as an antidote to the abuses of the ‘circus’ by allowing viewers to make their own 
judgments independent of the circus elements.”242 
 Moreover, the Court failed to acknowledge the steady progression by federal and state 
courts alike away from a complete prohibition of courtroom broadcasting and toward a 
permissive regime that vests authority in judges to protect against the concerns raised by the 
Court.  At the time of the Court’s decision in Chandler, nineteen states permitted coverage of 
both trial and appellate courts.243  Now, as Justice Breyer remarked, “42 States and two Federal 
District Courts currently give judges the discretion to broadcast civil nonjury trials.”244  Instead, 
the Perry Court selected one study that reached the ambiguous conclusion that courtroom 
broadcasting may affect witness testimony, a speculative and conclusory statement one might 
expect to find in the Estes decision, but not as the Court’s primary reason for forbidding the 
broadcast of a nonjury civil trial at a time when broadcasting technology is undeniably 
commonplace.  It is now clear that a majority of the Court’s members no longer believe that “the 
day may come when television will have become so commonplace an affair . . . as to dissipate all 
reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial process.”245 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the Court insisted that it expressed no view as to the merit of courtroom 
broadcasting in Hollingsworth v. Perry, one cannot help but detect a renewed hostility toward 
cameras that resembles the kneejerk suspicion characteristic of Estes v. Texas.  Given the wealth 
of research suggesting the harm is minimal, such an attitude toward broadcasting technology is 
anachronistic.  But the Court’s suggestion that any high-profile case would be inappropriate to 
broadcast is perhaps more damaging to the future prospects of courtroom broadcasting.246  
Indeed, if a nonjury civil trial of tremendous importance to the public at large is inappropriate for 
broadcasting, one is left to wonder what federal proceedings would be appropriate.  In an answer 
that will satisfy few, the Court spelled this out: cases that are “not high profile” and which do 
“not involve witnesses.”247  Still, one can take comfort in both the continued efforts of forty-two 
states to increase transparency in legal proceedings as well as in bipartisan efforts to enact the 
Sunshine in the Courtroom Act.  At this stage, it appears only a legislative solution will do with 
respect to high-profile cases brought in federal court. 
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